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## REVIEWS OF BOOKS

*Vorlesungen über Psychologie.* By OSWALD KÜLPE. Herausgegeben von KARL BUEHLER. 1920. Leipzig, S. Hirzel. Pp. viii, 304.

The sudden death of Oswald Külpe, which occurred on the 30th of December, 1915, snatched away in the midst of his productive and highly influential maturity a man whose genial personality had been impressed upon numerous American psychologists who had been privileged to meet him or perchance to study under his direction. Külpe left unsystematized and in some measure incoordinate the programme of investigation into the higher mental processes which he had been directing in his laboratories at Würzburg, Bonn, and Munich during the ten or more preceding years. It was therefore with unusual interest that one learned of the agreement that was speedily reached by certain of his former students to publish the various courses of university lectures which he had offered during the last years of his academic activity. The first of these posthumous works is now before us, and its perusal is a source of great satisfaction to those who knew the man, and who admired his critical acumen and breadth of view.

Yet there is also a sense of disappointment which can not fail to strike deeply in the minds of some, at least, who anticipated a statement, inadequate though it might be, formulating the newer ideas concerning the processes of thought which the steady stream of investigations emanating from the 'Würzburg School' had made desirable. For the lectures now published include no chapter on thought, and Bühler, who has edited the work with scrupulous fidelity to the original notes, tells us in his preface that Külpe had never lectured on this topic.

In the summer of 1909 the present writer found Külpe lecturing in his last semester at Würzburg on *Feeling and Thought*, a supplemental course offered as a complement to the general course in psychology given during the previous term. But even at this time the topic of thought was not reached, and the whole summer's course was taken up with the psychology of feeling. To feeling is devoted the last chapter of the present work, and it constitutes more than one quarter of the entire book.

Taken as a whole, the present lectures with their divisions into chapters and paragraphs follow with surprising fidelity the order, arrangement, and even the content of the lectures on psychology which the present writer heard as a student in 1902. Excepting the greater stress now laid upon functional psychology, and the implicit assumption of contents of thought, the treatment is similar, both in scope and in tone, to that of the course given thirteen years prior to the author's untimely death.

Yet so far as it goes the book is in no wise to be judged fragmentary. The plan is excellent, and the special topics are handled in a thorough-going manner. Data derived from a wide range of psychological investigations are marshalled together with a fine sense of objectivity, while the constructive criticism to which each topic is subjected is masterly in its evidence both of keen insight and of detailed knowledge.

At the beginning of each topic a brief paragraph summarizes the contents and conclusions of what follows. It was Külpe's practice to dictate this summary to his hearers before he entered upon a detailed exposition of his subject. There is also much of the personal touch in these lectures which, to those who knew Külpe and have sat under him, will bring back a vivid picture of the man and his method as a teacher. Even the tone of his voice seems to carry over from many of the passages.

The book is divided into five chapters. The first, being introductory, contains sections on the history of psychology, its concept and problem, followed by a discussion of psychological principles, and a study of sources and methods. We are told that psychology deals with the phenomena of experience in so far as they are subjectively determined. But although these phenomena are immediately dependent upon the ego, they are also immediately dependent upon other things, such as a nervous system. Hence, psychology must be regarded as something more than the "immediate experience" of Wundt's tautological definition, while the "intentionality" in which Brentano finds the characteristic of mentality is held to be too narrow a concept, excluding as it does the sensory, affective, and other contents of consciousness. Neither may the experience of psychology be confused with the phenomenology of Husserl; for Husserl is concerned only with explications, whereas psychology deals with factual data.

The second chapter treats of the general facts of mental life, sections being devoted to the waking and dreaming consciousness, hypnosis, the unity of mental life, the span of consciousness, individuality, psychical contents and functions. In this more than in any other chapter of the lectures Külpe touches upon the psychology of thought and the new orientation given his psychology by the investigation of this subject.

While the theory that underlies his treatment of dreams and hypnosis does not greatly vary from that of the lectures of 1902, there is an altered conception of the unity of consciousness. The significance of the *Aufgabe* having entered into the foundation of all unitary tendencies, the conception of a hierarchy of tasks, supraordinate and subordinate, is suggested and in some measure worked out. Upon closer study, the unity of consciousness becomes a multiplicity of tendencies, each unitary in its own way. Thus seven different types of unity are distinguished, the first being the unity of attention. Külpe's doctrine of attention is never clearly expressed in these lectures, and he devotes no section or paragraph to its place in his psychological system. No description is given of the content as affected by attention, though he holds that attention is limited to a few things. It can be fixated on a single content or group of contents, however, for long periods of time. The unitary influence of the attention provides a rank-order of conscious contents, a closer connection of these contents with one another, and a greater continuity of mental life. The monarchical arrangement of contents and the continuity attributable to dominating moments are resultants of attention. But what is attention itself? Presumably an act, with the diverse functions of ordering, connecting, and arranging contents both in continuous series and in monarchical groups.

A second type of conscious unity is to be found in the totalities of coexistence and sequence. Thus, we have fusion of tones, the figures and bodily forms of visual contents, the qualities of contact, and their complications. The unity of thinking that arises from the unity of a definite problem, a certain end and the direction taken by a line of reasoning, furnishes a third type. In all probability the unity of perception, remembrance, and imagination depends largely upon this characteristic of thinking. A fourth type is discerned in the unity of experience conditioned by regular and periodic happenings such as day and night, and the succession of events which repeat themselves daily. Very important is the fifth type, the unity of self: the fact that in some sense I remain the same despite the fluctuations of my experience, and that this unitary self finds its substance in the persistence of bodily sensations and the visual appearance of my person; in the psychical processes of perception, thinking, ideation, feeling, willing; in remembrances that arise from these experiences, and in the capacities which I develop through these recurrent acts and contents. A sixth type is provided by the selective characteristic of emotion: the unitary mood and temperament; and a seventh and last in the unitary direction

of volition. In the lectures of 1902 but four types of unity were distinguished; those attributable to attention, to the frequency and constancy of certain experiences, to the emotions, and to the will. The underlying theory, however, has not been greatly modified or clarified in its systematic aspect.

In considering the span of consciousness, Külpe points out the ambiguity of this problem and the complicated conditions which underly the range of awareness which chances to be under investigation. Attention is but one factor; the excitability of the organism, the nature of the ideas entertained, feelings, volition, and acts of thinking, are all important in determining the range of any moment in experience.

In the earlier lectures there follow at this point several comprehensive sections treating of the degrees of consciousness—sections which serve to introduce a detailed consideration of attention and apperception. The data of attention and the conditions both of attention and of apperception, together with a section on the theory of attention and one on practice, *Einstellung*, habituation and fatigue, are topics that do not appear in the present volume. Instead we have the scheme of the stages of consciousness which resulted from the experimental investigation of Ernst Westphal. Of interest is the comment that sensory definiteness and clearness do not necessarily change with a shift of attention. This point indicates again that attention is regarded by Külpe as an act of mind with diverse functions; it is not limited to the clarification of conscious contents, since a shift of attention does not necessarily make the content previously attended-to obscure.

As for the stages, of consciousness, we have only the report of Westphal's introspective results without a systematic treatment of their implications. First, an object is presented simply without relation to anything else in consciousness, though already it is an object. Secondly, the object is *noted*; a stage which brings no qualitative modification either in definiteness or clearness, but only a direction upon the content. The object is received: "it falls not like a stone into the water, but like a ball into the outstretched hand." At the third stage there is potential knowledge of the object. Its presence becomes an as yet unformulated knowledge about the object, and contains the possibility of naming it. The establishment of actual knowledge is, however, deferred to the fourth and last stage, in which the object is named or "nailed down." This developmental series of stages suggests, with respect to the problem of the span of consciousness, that one must distinguish the span of knowledge, the span of awareness, and the span of mere presence in consciousness; the first two being obviously of narrower range than the last. These stages also have an important bearing upon the unity of consciousness in the sense of the rank-order of contents that assemble themselves in any unitary experience.

The section on Individuality is descriptive and classificatory rather than a systematic treatment of fundamental traits resting upon an instinctive basis; but in the next section, on psychical contents and functions, we find a brief discussion of these two important groupings of psychological data. The contents are characterized as given, ready-made, as it were, to be apprehended as objective complexes, whereas the functions are the activities of the subject which perceives, remembers, cognizes, notes, thinks, loves, hates, hopes, and fears. The close connection of the two gives rise to a variety of attitudes. Although the connection is intimate we approach a dominance of function alone in states of expectancy, and of content alone in many dreams and in the absorption of concentrated effort. It is also evident upon analysis that acts and contents are independently variable, since the same content can be perceived, noted, judged, or otherwise apprehended. Contents may be directly observed, while functions can only be remembered. One can not assume an attitude of hopefulness and at the

same time observe the state of hoping, for the attitude of observation nullifies the attitude of hoping. Yet Külpe insists that functions are equally existential with the contents to which they apply: they are not to be regarded as hypothetical aids to explanation, but as immediately experienced and observed data of consciousness. The operations of the ego upon the contents of consciousness are neither hypothetical nor assumed, but are facts like any other facts. Despite this positive assertion it is difficult to understand how, through the mediation of memory, a satisfactory evidence can be gained of the psychological existence of these mental acts. Since it is admitted that they are probably at times unconscious, may they not always be so? This would in no wise destroy their actuality, though we should perhaps be obliged to admit that we can observe them only in the modifications which they produce in the contents upon which they act. Suggestive as these sections are, they leave much to be desired in the way of amplification, both in respect of pertinent investigation and of systematic theorization.

The chapter on sensation includes sections on quality, intensity, complication and fusion, contrast, and spatial character. One misses a section on time, although duration is mentioned as one of the attributes of sensation and the writer finds that the topic was treated rather fully in the lectures of 1902. The sections which dealt with the analysis of the special senses have been omitted by the editor, apparently because the notes on the sense-organs and the arousal of sensation appeared to be too meagre for publication.

The most striking feature of this chapter is the inclusion of space among the sensations. In his description of the sense of space Külpe refers to its unique quality and its intensity, varying both in direction and in magnitude. The elementary contents of space are single extensivities and distances, while the spatial complications give us surfaces, forms, and places. The impressions of space involve the special sense-organs of vision, skin, joint, tendon, and muscle, and there are spatial images of each modality. The difficulties which must be met before one can fully accept this view are then treated with remarkable candor. It is freely admitted that the intimacy of the relation of space and the sensory qualities to which it is attached make it appear more as an attribute than as an independent content. What is the adequate stimulus of space: is it objective space as such? How does it happen that different sense-organs afford the same spatial impression? These questions are not easily set aside; and it is even suggested that the spatial character of experience might be regarded as a product of the primary sensory arousal of certain sense-organs rather than as being itself an immediate sensory datum. Despite these difficulties Külpe thinks it possible to hold that space is sensory, its psychological character resting upon a phenomenological content distinct from the logical space of mathematics or common sense.

The fourth chapter deals with mental images. Though images are similar to sensations, this similarity does not necessarily apply to their order and connection. Indeed, the functional acts of the mind have a far greater influence upon the image than they have upon sensation; hence we find difficulty in placing two images in the same order of intensity or vividness. The brightest light does not blind us when it is imaged, nor is corporeality a positive characteristic of images, save possibly in certain dream-images. Yet we must sharply distinguish the meaning of the image from its phenomenological content; for the reference of a content to its object is never a psychological characteristic of the content itself. The distinction of image and sensation is further complicated by the transitional stages we meet in pseudo-sensations, in memory after-images, and in hallucinations. The distinction is therefore one which is based primarily on the non-psychological conditions of arousal. The sensations were defined as simple contents

arising from the stimulation of sense organs; the images must be different because they are otherwise aroused.

Certain fundamental conceptions are elaborated with respect to arousal. These may be enumerated as: (1) the basis of reproduction in the sensory impression, once made and retained; (2) a general tendency to give back the images of our sensations as ideas; (3) a tendency of perseveration, which favors the reproduction of some impressions more than others; (4) the association of images or bases of reproduction, which favors the reciprocal revival of the one by the other; (5) the tendencies of reproduction which are established by association; (6) the readiness for revival, which may be variously conditioned to occasion; (7) a constellation of ideas with its generative inhibitions and facilitations of imaginal contents.

The fifth and last chapter, on Feeling, is a critique of this concept, together with an evaluation of methods and results. Here again a fine discrimination of the views and the data which have been gathered by various theorists and investigators is more evident than the attempt to give feeling its proper place in a system of psychology. The two criteria which Külpe has advanced for the definition of feeling are its *universality* and its *actuality*. The first is objective in as much as the feelings have no precise anatomical basis, but attach themselves equally to sensations, ideas, and functions. The second criterion, the actuality of feeling, is indicated by the fact that the conditions and laws of reproduction do not obtain for it. Feelings are always original; they are never copies or remembrances of other feelings. While maintaining that pleasantness and unpleasantness are the two elemental qualities of feeling, Külpe proceeds to characterize different affective complexes as they are conditioned by different modes of arousal. These are the stimulus or sensory feelings, the content feelings, and the act or functional feelings. Distinction is also made between active and passive feelings, and between particular and common feelings. The active and passive feelings, differ not in quality but in respect to motor and intellectual accompaniments. Particular and common feelings are likewise of the same quality, but the former attach themselves to parts in a total consciousness, while the latter are all-pervading. Whether a common feeling is the resultant of a multiplicity of stimuli or of the spreading out of one or more particular feelings we do not know.

In summary, Külpe divides consciousness into acts and contents, the latter including sensations, images, thoughts, and feelings. It may be questioned whether he has made his case for the consciousness of mental acts; and he would have been the first to admit the need of a much more detailed analysis, both experimental and theoretical, before the functions of mind can be properly classified and their multiple influences upon the contents of consciousness adequately determined.

His treatment of the contents themselves suffers from this uncertainty regarding the attitudes under which they may be observed and defined. Recognizing as he did the tremendous influence of the functional setting upon the content observed, he seems to have preferred to elaborate upon the conditions which obtain for various types of experience, rather than to attempt a first-hand scrutiny of the phenomena themselves. Thus sensation is defined with reference to the sense-organ stimulated, and the image, though its distinction is maintained, is never clearly marked off from sensation. Feeling in turn is defined by extra-psychological means, and we can only surmise what might have been the definition of the thought content if that topic had been included.

On the whole one must conclude that these lectures were the incomplete expression of a man who was too busily engaged in the direction of a large number of research-problems to find the time in which to systematize his psychology with the precision which he himself was by nature accustomed to demand. The psychology of the higher mental processes which he

did much to establish was a field so large and so intriguing that he felt the necessity of awaiting further investigation before he could commit himself to a systematic account of it. Thus the lectures embrace much that is old, including the entire framework which he had formulated prior to the new orientation which the thought psychology gave him. But to say this is not to criticize either Külpe or his scrupulous editor. While it is doubtful if Külpe himself would have consented to the publication of his lecture-notes as we find them, we may be thankful nevertheless for their appearance, since even in their uneven state they suggest many important problems and many significant points of view. He who reads them sympathetically will discern a multitude of fine observations that will contribute substantially to any serious attempt to construct a psychology adequate to the demands both of our existing knowledge of the subject and of our ever-widening field of research.

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*Suggestion and Autosuggestion.* By CHARLES BAUDOUIN. Translated by N. and C. PAUL. New York, Dodd, Mead and Company, 1921. Pp. 349.

Baudouin is a pupil of Coué, who has been carrying on a large clinic at Nancy since 1910. This book is a theoretical exposition of the basis of Coué's practice, which is *autosuggestion*. The chief obstacle to autosuggestion lies in the fact that, under ordinary conditions, the more we try to concentrate our attention on the idea we need, the more attention tends to waver between this idea and opposing ideas. The man who was told that he would find buried treasure if he could dig without once thinking of a certain tabooed phrase had little chance of success. Thus voluntary autosuggestion reverses itself, according to the law which Baudouin has styled that of reversed effort. Autosuggestion must not begin with an effort of 'will', but by a method of relaxation which brings the 'subconscious' into play. One puts oneself into a restful attitude and tries to think of nothing at all. After a time one repeats to oneself the suggestion one wishes to accept. The preliminary relaxation is the essential thing in autosuggestion as in heterosuggestion. The translators, by the way, have translated the difficult word '*recueillement*' rather unhappily as 'collection'. The ordinary translation 'concentration' would have been quite as good, but 'withdrawal' would perhaps be better, since '*se recueillir*' means not a direction outward of the concentrating powers of attention but a gathering of them inward.—What is the advantage of autosuggestion over heterosuggestion? The two evidently are essentially one in nature: every accepted suggestion from without becomes an autosuggestion. But autosuggestion is free from the hampering suggestion that someone else is necessary to the situation, a freedom that certainly is most desirable.

Children, however, are not allowed the precious privilege of autosuggestion. A chapter on their education presents us with the familiar picture (not often, let us hope, realized in life) of the mother bending over the sleeping child and murmuring suggestions into its ears. We teachers, who give suggestions to the young, pacify our consciences by the comforting thought that they will reject what does not naturally belong to them. We can but be thankful that we, ourselves, were allowed to grow up without ever having lost our normal powers of resistance to our parents.

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*Elements of Folk Psychology: Outlines of a Psychological History of the Development of Mankind.* By WILHELM WUNDT. Authorized translation by E. L. SCHAUB. London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd.; New York, The Macmillan Co. 1921. Pp. xxiii., 532.

It is encouraging, as a sign of the times, that this translation has reached a second printing. The exposition of the *Elemente* is simple;